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Abstract: The current paper outlines an exploratory case study in which we 
examined the extent to which specific communities of Twitter users engaged 
with the debate about the security threat known as ‘Heartbleed’ in the first few 
days after this threat was exposed. The case study explored which professional 
groups appeared to lead the debate about Heartbleed, the nature of the 
communication (tweets and retweets), and evidence about behaviour change. 
Using keywords from the Twitter user profiles, six occupational groups were 
identified, each of which were likely to have a direct interest in learning about 
Heartbleed (including legal, financial, entrepreneurial, press, and IT 
professionals). The groups participated to different degrees in the debate about 
Heartbleed. This exploratory case study provides an insight into information 
sharing, potential communities of influence, and points for future research in 
the absence of a voice of authority in the field of cybersecurity. 
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1 Introduction 
Twitter, like many other social media, is a frequently used social medium in 
communication campaigns, particularly in the area of health (e.g., Morris, 2011). The 
advantage of social media is that it allows rapid dissemination of official advice (e.g., in 
the form of tweets and retweets (RTs) on Twitter; see also Li and Li, 2014) to various 
stakeholders (e.g., Pang et al., 2014) via a large network of people who can continue to 
share the information, thus reaching a broad audience (i.e., a snowball effect). Such 
awareness campaigns have provided researchers with a wealth of data relating to a wide 
range of issues such as flu trends, vaccination attitudes and psychological wellbeing 
(Achrekar et al., 2011; Anger and Kittl, 2011; Byun et al., 2013; De Choudhury, 2014; 
Kim et al., 2009; Love et al., 2013; see also Vargo et al., 2015). 
One area of interest in pandemic research is how people and organisations respond to 
crises in different ways (see also Pang et al., 2014; Miyabe et al., 2014; Romenti et al., 
2014). One example in healthcare is the exploration of how anti-vaccination sentiment 
can have an impact on discussions and the spread of information through social media 
networks (e.g., Chew and Eysenbach, 2010). Similar approaches have been used to 
explore sentiments of customers about products, and access the customer’s mind set 
(Misopoulos et al., 2014). 
In order to better understand how and with whom information is shared, researchers 
may wish to ask several exploratory questions: which specific Twitter groups participate 
in debates when a crisis or incident becomes public knowledge? Which groups participate 
and contribute more than others (creating potential disseminators and opinion shapers)? 
Does the Twitter data provide evidence that users respond to the crisis or incident by 
changing their behaviours? Some of these questions may already be answered based on 
existing research. In terms of consequences, the views and behaviours that people will 
adopt are likely to be in line with the normative beliefs of their social groups (see 
McNeill and Briggs, 2014; Mols et al., 2014). Such groups (e.g., parents, health 
professionals or alternative-health advocates) share a common identity and draw on the 
advice of each other because of within-group trust and willingness to adhere to group 
norms – also known as ‘communities of influence’ (Zhou, 2011; see further work on 
‘users of influence’ by Räbiger and Spiliopoulou, 2015). Analysis of these communities 
can be conducted in a variety of ways (see Ediger et al., 2010; Pagoto et al., 2013; 
Zappavigna, 2014), each of which seek to explore the role of different stakeholders 
(groups) on social media. 
Cybersecurity threats could be considered as cyber pandemics that affect a large 
number of people in often unknown ways, creating uncertainty and a search for 
information and advice. Researching and improving the effectiveness of communication 
in security ‘pandemics’ becomes more important as such pandemics are likely to reoccur 
in the future. The ‘Heartbleed’ bug in OpenSSL was selected as a case study of a 
cybersecurity pandemic as it involved many different stakeholders and communities of 
influence. This bug allowed ‘man in the middle’ attacks to access memory leaks between 
clients and servers (see Callegati et al., 2009). Some important differences exist between 
pandemic communications in health versus security. In the health sector, health 
authorities offer terminology and advice which is often picked up by the wider public 
(Chew and Eysenbach, 2010). Communication in the area of cybersecurity is less 
structured, not necessarily top-down and driven by a multiplicity of sources along with 
peer information sharing (e.g., via Twitter and other social media). 
Several frameworks exist that help us understand the various elements involved in 
shaping behaviour in response to an event such as Heartbleed. We focus on the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) to better understand the dynamics in the case of 
Heartbleed. This theory is useful in this context because it accounts for different 
influencers on end-user decision making. The Theory of Planned Behaviour suggests that 
attitudes and norms (which we propose are captured by tweets) are precursors to 
intentions and actions. We outline the components and relationships between them in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 The components of the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
According to this theory, attitudes are expectations or behavioural beliefs about specific 
outcomes, while subjective norms are shaped by perceived social pressure (individuals 
generally judge their behaviour against their peers – those who are active on Twitter may 
feel more inclined to follow the recommendations of similar others), both are expected to 
shape individuals’ intentions, actions and decision making to perform a behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991). A third factor, perceived control, relates to the extent to which people 
believe they can effect change. Those with little perceived control (which may be more 
prominent for certain Twitter users than others) may struggle to form and execute an 
implementation intention (Glanz et al., 2008). 
While Twitter data cannot be used to show behaviour change per se (except when the 
tweets clearly reference behaviours such as password change), this data can be used to 
reveal the way attitudes and ‘norms’ differ across the various communities and show how 
these are associated with specific behavioural intentions. Perceived control may have 
been a particularly important element in the case of Heartbleed. In the first few days 
following the first public announcement, it was unclear which advice users should follow. 
As a result, both experts and non-experts participated in the debate (see also Kelion, 
2014). Perceptions of control were compromised in this situation as individuals were 
essentially unable to act on any advice or reduce the risks to their data until the servers 
used by their various service providers (e.g., financial, health, educational, social media 
and governmental institution) had been patched first. This uncertainty made them 
dependent on the advice and behaviour of others (subjective norms), informed their 
attitudes about the risk to themselves, and influenced their control perception of whether 
or not they could secure their data by, for example, changing their passwords. 
1.1 Exploratory research questions 
This study focused on communications about the Heartbleed cybersecurity incident via 
Twitter. Twitter data was captured from April to May 2014. As there is very little known 
about web-based communities of influence in relation to cybersecurity incidents, we 
proposed the following exploratory research questions (RQ’s) to assess whether or not 
certain groups can be identified in relation to this phenomenon: 
RQ 1 Which specific Twitter groups (communities of influence) can be identified 
amongst the Twitter users? (Who are the participants?) 
RQ 2 How and to what degree did these groups participate in the debate about 
Heartbleed? 
RQ 3 Which groups tweet at a similar or different rate across the first few weeks of the 
Heartbleed debate? 
RQ 4 What was the focus (content) of the tweets? 
RQ 5 What evidence is there that users discuss actual behaviour change (in this case, 
password change)? 
The next two sections include the method and the results section. The method section 
outlines the procedure and details regarding data collection. The headings of the results 
section are organised in line with the research questions: 
1 Identification of Twitter groups (participants) 
2 Proportion of tweets contributed to the debate 
3 Retweet (RT) behaviour 
4 Group differences in tweet content – keyword analysis 
5 Behavioural change: using the example of password change. 
 The discussion follows the results and includes a number of areas for future research. 
2 Methods 
2.1 Data collection approach 
In order to learn more about who was involved in the information exchange about 
Heartbleed, Twitter data was collected for the first few weeks following the first news 
release about Heartbleed (8 April 8 to 13 May 2014). This time period marked the 
beginning of the Heartbleed debate (the bug fix was published first on 7 April, see 
Heartbleed.com, 2014; Nieva, 2014). Data was collected with a Python script using the 
Twitter public API stream and was subject to limits imposed by Twitter. Tweets were 
gathered by using the Twitter Streaming API to search for tweets containing the keyword 
‘Heartbleed’. The final dataset (also considering the streaming limits imposed) included 
around 100,000 tweets (including RTs). 
2.2 General participant description 
Once the duplicates had been removed, the dataset included 91,414 tweets from a 
randomised, English speaking sample. A review of a third of the tweets revealed 
participants came from more than 100 different countries. This suggests that the tweets 
captured the views of individuals from around the globe. This study utilised a multi-
method approach, using both qualitative and quantitative approaches (see also 
Misopoulos et al., 2014) to analyse sentiments as well as frequencies of specific trends 
occurring in the data. The methods used to answer each research question are described 
in the appropriate sections below. The exact affiliation of participants (and thus Twitter 
groups) was identified as part of the first research question. Details are outlined in the 
results Section 3.1. 
3 Results 
Results are organised into several sections, each addressing one of the exploratory 
research questions. These analyses focused on the total number of tweets in each group, 
rather than the total number of tweeters. The decision to focus on the tweets rather than 
the tweeters was based on two aspects: the focus was to explore how different groups of 
users rather than individual tweeters participated in the debate. Secondly, social norms 
may play a role in such groups, thus a focus on groups instead of individuals enabled the 
researchers to examine group-specific behaviours (such as recommendations of particular 
actions) rather than individual influencers (based on individual Twitter profiles). 
3.1 RQ1 – Identification of Twitter groups (participants) 
Past evidence suggests that communities with separate memberships exist within 
Twitter’s network of users which may not necessarily be formal groups (see Ch’ng,  
2015). In order to identify communities of influence, the researchers first determined 
which Twitter groups were most likely to be involved in the debate and/or directly 
affected by Heartbleed (e.g., insecurities in servers affect finance, legal, marketing 
professionals, IT and entrepreneurs particularly negatively, with the press having an 
important role in shaping communication). Knowledge sharing of critical information 
about Heartbleed in these communities may be influenced by potential benefits resulting 
from exchanging information, such as access to new information (see also work on 
rewards and altruism as motivators of knowledge sharing in Lin and Huang, 2013). 
Once these occupational groups had been identified, and specific keywords were 
determined for each group, the profile of each Twitter user was coded accordingly. This 
approach was based on other work that also utilised information in Twitter profiles. For 
example, Twitter profile information about contacts has been used to make personality 
trait attributions (e.g., Quercia et al., 2011), to examine user contributions and contacts 
(see Zhang and Nasraoui, 2008), and to cluster individuals into groups or derive group 
profiles for use in simulated learning systems (see Ammari et al., 2012). Our goal was to 
identify similar groups using keywords in each profile (Fernandez et al., 2014; Sloan  
et al., 2015; for other methods see Mizzaro et al., 2015; Xie et al., 2014). 
To identify these groups, the data was coded in several ways. This was done using R 
and a set of grouping keywords (the base software only, no extra package was used).  
R is a statistical programming language with the flexibility of being able to handle  
both textual and numerical data (see R Core Team, 2014). Tweets were allocated as 
belonging to users of a specific occupational group when the user profile matched one or 
more of the keywords (see also Sloan et al., 2015). Allocation was restricted to only one 
group. If a profile included more than one keyword from different groups (which was 
only the case for a dozen cases), the tweeter was allocated to the group that matched the 
profile best. 
The keywords were identified in discussion between researchers. These included: 
1 IT professionals: keywords ‘IT professional’, ‘computer’, and/or ‘security’ in profile 
2 Legal professionals: keywords ‘law’, ‘barrister’, ‘solicitor’ and/or ‘legal’ in profile 
3 Finance professionals: keywords ‘bank’, ‘finance’, ‘insurance’ 
4 Self-employed professionals: keywords ‘entrepreneur’, ‘self-employed’, ‘intellectual 
property’, and/or ‘own company’ in profile 
5 Press professionals: keywords ‘press’, ‘journalist’, ‘writer’, ‘news’, ‘publisher’ 
and/or ‘blog’ in profile (please note that only .28% of classifications were based on 
‘blog’ alone) 
6 Those involved in marketing, by selecting them based on the ‘marketing’ phrases in 
their profiles. 
This process allowed a definite group allocation for the users of a total of 44,673 tweets 
(48.1%). All remaining tweets were included in a group of ‘unclassified’ tweeters (0). 
These cases featured empty user profiles or profile descriptions that did not match any of 
our key terms for the other groups (Table 1). 
Table 1 Presence of professional groups most likely affected by Heartbleed in present sample 
Groups n % of N 
IT professional 21,523 23.5 
Legal 997 1.1 
Finance 1,459 1.6 
Entrepreneur 2,488 2.7 
Press 16,904 18.5 
Marketing 1,302 1.4 
Unclassified 46,741 51.1 
Total 91,414 100.0 
The remaining 51.9% of tweets were not matched to any of these groups. This was due to 
several reasons. First, some did not match any of the keywords used to identify the six 
occupational groups that were most likely to have been affected by and thus interested in 
a solution for Heartbleed. This means they may also not have the same stake in the 
debate. Second, some tweeters in the unclassified group did not include sufficient 
information for categorisation. 
3.2 RQ2 – Proportion of tweets contributed to the debate 
Another important element of our analysis was to examine the extent to which different 
users engaged in the debate across time, using the proportion of tweets from different 
groups. The participation rates (capturing the tweets from the occupational groups) were 
converted into percentages (using the subtotal for each group to assess the percentage of 
the group that participated in the debate on given days). Figure 2 shows the percentage of 
Twitter users in each group involved in the discussion over the course of each week. 
Figure 2 Percentage of groups tweeting about Heartbleed across five weeks (see online version 
for colours) 
The analysis was conducted using the chi square test of independence as this enables 
researchers to compare how observed data (tweets per group) relates to what would have 
been expected by chance (i.e., in proportion to their size). For example, if each of the 
occupational groups contributed to the debate to the same degree in each week, the 
proportion of tweets observed should be equal across each of the five weeks (and there 
should be no significant difference between the observed count of tweets and the 
expected number of tweets). In the current study, some occupational groups were 
expected to be more vocal in some five week than others as the problem and 
repercussions of Heartbleed became more known over time. The results of the chi square 
analyses suggested that the proportions of tweets originating from each occupational 
group are not equal across the five weeks. The frequencies showing participation patterns 
are outlined in Figure 2. 
The patterns for each of the five weeks suggest that the groups participated to 
different degrees in the debate (as reflected in the number of tweets) as time went on – 
assuming, of course, that our tweets were collected from relatively homogeneous and 
comparative samples each week. The results suggest the following. First, both IT 
professionals and the press group tweeted more and more over the course of the five 
weeks, while other groups became more vocal at particular but select points over the five 
weeks only. IT professionals in our dataset increased their observed vs. expected tweets 
steadily across all five weeks (χ2(4) = 1,096.73, p < .001). A similar tendency could be 
seen in the press group (χ2(4) = 278.25, p < .001). Second, the close relationship between 
tweeting counts observed for the IT and press suggests that the press may simply be 
mirroring the activity of the IT groups. Third, the tweet pattern also appeared to differ 
across the five weeks for the legal group (χ2(4) = 79.05, p < .001), the financial group 
(χ2(4) = 7.85, p = .097), and the entrepreneurs (χ2(4) = 13.663, p = .008). No significant 
differences in tweet patterns were observed for the marketing professionals in terms of 
their tweet rate across all five weeks (χ2(4) = 5.710, p = .222). These different groups are 
likely to have had different perspectives on the crisis and how to react and the discussion 
about appropriate responses is likely to have created norms among each group. 
3.3 RQ3 – RT behaviour 
The RT frequencies observed for different occupational groups were examined next. 
Such frequencies can help establish which groups appeared to share information more 
widely. The focus was on which Twitter users responded to, rather than initiated, a tweet 
(see also research on credibility and favourability of communal versus exchange tweets 
by Li and Li, 2014). The analysis was conducted with all identifiable user groups, 
excluding the unclassified group (IT professional, legal, finance, entrepreneur, press, and 
marketing, n = 44,673). All RTs (12.2%; total RTs n = 11,150) were identified using R 
(base packages). 
Table 2 shows the observed and expected values for both tweets and RTs. The actual 
tweets are listed in the first column to provide a baseline against which to compare the 
number of RTs within the groups. The second column lists the RTs in each group. Chi 
square analysis results indicate a difference among different professional groups in their 
tweeting and retweeting patterns (χ2(5) = 1,761.98, p < .001). An example shows how to 
interpret the contents of Table 2. The frequencies for IT professionals suggest that the 
number of observed unique (i.e., non-retweeted) tweets was lower than would have been 
expected statistically by chance (obs./exp. = 14,959/15,605), while the number of 
observed RTs was higher than the expected number (obs./exp. = 6,838/6,178). This 
means IT professionals had issued fewer unique tweets compared to what would have 
been expected for this group. At the same time, they had actually retweeted content more 
often. Perceived tweet and RT patterns were also examined statistically, in line with the 
descriptive outlined for the groups in Table 2. More information about the patterns is 
provided in the notes for those readers interested in the statistical difference in 
frequencies. 
When comparing tweet against RT for each group, the IT group (χ2(1) = 129.33, 
p < .001) retweeted materials significantly more often than sending original tweets. The 
same was observed for the legal group (χ2(1) = 28.07, p < .001). The press send out more 
original tweets than RTs (χ2(1) = 2,250.42, p < .001), similar to marketing (χ2(1) = 28.57, 
p < .001). In other words, the press and marketing groups appeared to create content more 
rather than simply sharing it like other groups. The finance group (χ2(1) = .71, p = .400) 
and the entrepreneurial group (χ2(1) = 2.65, p = .104) were, however, just as likely to 
tweet or RT. 
Table 2 Tweets and non-tweet frequencies 
Groups 
Tweet frequencies RT frequencies 
% in each 
group Obs (exp) 
(obs-exp)2
exp 
% in each 
group obs (exp) 
(obs-exp)2 
exp 
IT profess. 69.5% 14,959 (15,605) 26.74 31.8% 6,838 (6,178) 70.51 
Legal 68.0% 678 (755) 7.85 37.7% 376 (299) 19.83 
Finance 76.6% 1,118 (1,103) .20 28.9% 422 (437) 0.513 
Entrepreneur 72.0% 1,791 (1,827) .71 30.5% 760 (723) 1.893 
Press 90.0% 15,210 (12,657) 514.96 14.5% 2,458 (5,011) 1,300.703 
Marketing 81.2% 1,058 (970) 7.98 22.7% 296 (384) 20.17 
∑ (tweets) 34,814 (32,917) 558.449 11,150 (13,032) 1,413.61 
Notes: Note that df(5) → F(558.4451/5) = 111.689 → 1–111.689 = –110, which is smaller 
than .05 and subsequently there is a difference in tweet frequency between groups. 
In terms of tweeting patterns in each group, we conducted a number of additional 
analyses: using the equation 
2( )
exp
observed expected−
 we obtain 558.449***. To
compute the χ2-value the expected tweets are distracted from the observed tweets 
divided by the observed tweets. Values are squared so that the sum is unequal 0. 
The sum of the column represents the χ2-value for the column. Subsequently there 
is an in-between group difference as the descriptive values already indicate. Since 
our χ2-value is 558.45 and subsequently greater than χ2crit = 11.07, the null 
hypothesis is rejected, the groups differ in their tweeting behaviour. Using the 
probability of success in a Bernoulli experiment significance can also be computed 
cell wise (Miettinen and Nurminen, 1985; Koutras et al., 2006). Each group 
significantly differs from the tweeting behaviour that would have been expected. 
For example, using odd-ratio to describe the difference in tweeting behaviour we 
find that IT professionals (14,959/34,814 = 0.4296835) are 22 times as likely as 
legal (678/34,814) to tweet about Heartbleed (0.43/0.02 = 21.5). Please note that 
the results remain highly significant even when controlling for alpha-value inflation 
using the false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). In terms of 
retweeting patterns, the same analysis was conducted. Since categories have not 
changed the critical Chi-Square value remains χ2crit = 11.07. Subsequently the null 
hypothesis can be rejected; the groups differ in their retweeting behaviour. Using 
the probability of success in a Bernoulli experiment it was found that the groups 
significantly deviate from the retweeting behaviour expected. 
3.4 RQ4 – Group differences in tweet content – keyword analysis 
Expanding on the previous analyses, R was used to identify the main keywords occurring 
in tweets in each of the six groups (including unique tweets as well as RTs). The keyword 
frequency provides a means to assess the most prominent themes in tweets. As expected, 
the content of tweets generally listed technology-related words (including web, internet, 
InfoSec, update, tech, source, software, threat, servers, risk, protect and risk). Some 
keywords were specific to Heartbleed (bug, VPN, security, password, data, open SSL, 
cybersecurity and hackers). In addition, many of the groups referred to organisations or 
products (apps, android, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, and NSA). 
Authentication was also a topic discussed by the individuals in the IT, entrepreneurs and 
finance group. Patches were discussed by the IT, marketing and press group. The service 
‘logmeonce’ was predominantly mentioned by marketing, entrepreneurs and finance 
Twitter users. ‘logmeonce’ is ‘a multi-platform security management solution supporting 
PC, Mac, Android, iPhone, and iPad’ (logmeonce.com) Finally, both marketing and 
finance discussed Heartbleed in relation to mobile technology. 
Some keywords were also group-specific. For IT, these included banking, code and 
Linux. In the legal group, tweets made references to keywords such as government, 
power, impact, law and privacy. The finance group discussed tax, filing, takes and tips. 
The entrepreneurial group discussed ideas, initiative and start-ups. The press tweeted 
about networks, targets, Windows and switches (e.g., services). Lastly, the marketing 
group was concerned with companies, consumers, encryption, and (social) media. These 
findings suggest that while the debate about Heartbleed focused on many of the same 
issues, the groups also had specific concerns that were unique to their industry/sector and 
expertise. 
Figure 3 Network graph of all RTs (see online version for colours) 
The results were verified using various visualisation tools such as Gephi (Bastian et al., 
2009), ForceAtlas2 (see Jacomy et al., 2014) and iGraph (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006). 
Some researchers have developed specific visualisation tools for Twitter (see Aragón  
et al., 2011). The focus of these analyses was on examining the relationship between 
users specifically, rather than the actual tweets. As anticipated and illustrated in Figure 3, 
the users of the ‘unclassified group’ were located at the periphery of the graph when 
visualising their influence in the debate (in other words, they were less influential). 
Separate analyses revealed that RTs were particularly prevalent for groups associated 
with IT and the press. 
3.5 RQ5 – Behavioural change: using the example of password change 
The last research question explored the extent to which users discussed changing 
passwords (implying potential behaviour change) In order to prepare the data; the entire 
dataset was recoded using several different methods. The work frequency of ‘password’ 
was explored first using NVivo 10 (Richards, 1999). NVivo is a program that enables 
analysis of unstructured data by providing various search, query and visualisation tools. 
Next, the exact phrases used by Twitter users were examined. These were coded as: 
1 recommending password changes in general 
2 indicating password change has been made, and finally 
3 no password change or against password change. 
Specifically, using NVivo and Excel key word searches, these identified phrases were 
then selected as search terms. 
1 In terms of advice: 23 different word groupings were used to identify advice  
(n = 2,680). Examples include ‘passwords you need to change’, ‘change your 
passwords’ and ‘passwords you should change’. 
2 In terms of expressed behaviour change, seven search phrases were located, such as 
‘changed passwords’ or ‘changing all of my passwords’ (n = 498). 
3 Those tweets advocating no behaviour change were identified using seven word 
phrases such as ‘have not changed my passwords’ (n = 64). 
Table 3 Discussion of passwords in tweets amongst different professional groups 
Groups General advice (1) Change indication (2) No Change (3) 
IT professional (n = 21,523) 464 (2.15%) 115 (.53%) 16 (.07%) 
Legal (n = 997) 37 (3.71%) 5 (.50%) 2 (.20%) 
Finance (n = 1,459) 63 (4.32%) 8 (.55%) 1 (.07%) 
Entrepreneur (n = 2,488) 86 (3.46%) 11 (.44%) 2 (.08%) 
Press (n = 16,904) 387 (2.29%) 97 (.57%) 14 (.08%) 
Marketing (n = 1,302) 50 (3.84%) 10 (.77%) 1 (.08%) 
Unclassified (n = 46,741) 1,593 (3.41%) 252 (.54%) 28 (.06%) 
Total 2,680 498 64 
The word ‘login’ was used in other contexts than password change, so these tweets were 
not included in the analysis of tweet content. Counts for each coding are listed in Table 3. 
The total number of tweets coded for in this analysis was 3,242 (3.54% of tweets). The 
low count is perhaps indicative of: 
a ambivalence over what to do 
b the predominantly information-sharing nature of Twitter rather than a forum to 
declare personal intentions/behaviours (cf., Chew and Eysenbach, 2010). 
Despite this, the level of behaviourally-relevant information is high enough in absolute 
(rather than relative) terms to be of interest and thus can provide insight into behavioural 
intentions. 
When examining which tweets (associated with specific occupational groups and 
including the unclassified group as well, n = 7) advocated any of the three positions, only 
a statistically significant group effect was observed for who recommended password 
change in general (χ2(6) = 125.70, p < .001, N = 91,391). Tweets from the legal (obs./exp. 
= 37/29), finance (obs./exp. = 63/43), entrepreneurial groups (obs./exp. = 86/73) and the 
users in the unclassified group (obs./exp. = 1,593/1,370) promoted password change 
more heavily. In contrast, IT professionals (obs./exp. = 464/631) and the press promoted 
password change less often than expected (obs./exp. = 387/495). 
Several explanations may be offered for why password change was not as much of a 
topic as expected amongst IT professionals and the press. On the one hand, the IT 
professionals were aware that changing the passwords was not the immediate solution. 
First, the bug had to be fixed on the servers. Second, once the servers had been patched, 
only then should the users change their password. This may explain the lower than 
expected frequency observed in terms of tweets advising password changes. In addition, 
by recent accounts up to 300,000 servers still remain at risk from Heartbleed (see 
Hamilton, 2014). As a result, IT professionals may have been more aware of Heartbleed 
being a security risk. 
In response to this, IT professionals did not appear to take the lead in the discussion 
of password change although they would have been the more knowledgeable Twitter 
users to educate others. They appeared to focus on disseminating new information – 
without recommending behavioural change to the same degree as observed in the groups 
identified as financial, legal and entrepreneurial. The latter groups may have had a greater 
vested interest in educating others about the risks due to their potential role as service 
providers (in banks, legal settings, and business). They may have been required to be 
seen to be doing something and so reduce the perception of risk by increasing 
self-efficacy through the prescription of a definite action that could be performed to 
maintain user safety. That said there is no guarantee that the advice would be appropriate. 
4 Discussion 
The wide use of technological means to save, transmit and share data has created 
numerous new opportunities for new threats to arise; threats that may result in concerns 
and vulnerabilities for many thousands or even millions of people. Exploring how people 
respond to crises is an important concern in pandemic research, similar to other  
crisis-focused research in other areas than health or security (see also Miyabe et al., 2014; 
Pang et al., 2014; Romenti et al., 2014). Cybersecurity threats represent ‘cyber 
pandemics.’ In this paper, Heartbleed was examined as a case study of a security 
‘pandemic’, a situation similar to a health pandemic in which a need for action and 
further information arises. 
In this exploratory analysis of Twitter data, several different occupational groups 
were engaged in the debate about Heartbleed (RQ1), in the absence of any clear national 
or international voice of authority (RQ2). Additional research questions focused on the 
activity of these groups over the first few weeks (RQ3), the content of RTs (RQ4), and 
any evidence of Twitter users responding to the threat by discussing and changing their 
behaviours (specifically passwords, RQ5). A summary of findings is presented next. 
The debate as captured in our dataset did not appear to be led by the most 
knowledgeable group (the IT professionals). That is, going on their activity while also 
controlling for the number of IT professionals identified and the number of their tweets 
captured in the dataset, their activity in terms of tweets is relatively low or on par with 
only the legal group in terms of the proportion of tweets and RTs issued by the members 
of the other groups (Table 2). The press and marketing group produced – given the group 
size – more tweets as a group about Heartbleed than the IT group. 
These trends may be interpreted in two possible ways. While it is entirely possible 
that the IT group retweeted content could be viewed as evidence that they played a 
supporting role in the debate (see also work on message strategies by Li and Li, 2014). 
However, another interpretation focuses on expertise rather than leadership in this debate. 
That is, it is also possible that the Twitter users captured in the IT group may have 
realised that the potential for peer-to-peer problem solving (see also work by Chen et al., 
2013) was not an option in the case of Heartbleed. This may have shaped how they 
decided to share knowledge. Future research into similar cyber-incidents may provide 
more clarity about the motivations, attitudes, and knowledge contribution strategies of IT 
professionals depending on the nature of the cybersecurity incident. 
The impact of messages from the IT group may have been significantly bolstered by 
the press group whose tweeting patterns closely mirrored those of the IT group. 
Visualisation of RTs also demonstrated that the majority of information sharing in the 
form of RTs was from IT professionals and the press group that functioned as sources of 
information for other users. These two groups may have felt more involved in the issue 
(see also Wang et al., 2012) and hence more willing to contribute their knowledge and 
resources to sharing information with the online community. Nevertheless, the results 
suggest that no particular group emerged as a voice of influence in the debate captured in 
our dataset. 
Further quantitative analyses were conducted with tweets to examine the extent to 
which password change was discussed by users. The results suggested that changing 
one’s password was not a common topic amongst the tweets that had been collected 
(3.54% of tweets made references to passwords). IT professionals were significantly less 
likely to promote password change, probably because they were aware that this would not 
fix the problem overall. Instead, legal, finance and entrepreneurs discussed or 
recommended password change more often. In the case of Heartbleed, the average user 
had no control over the situation (only if the site is fixed would it make sense to change 
one’s password). 
Our exploratory results support three conclusions. First, according to the data, there 
was no evidence that any particular group took on the role of authority. Secondly, the 
tendency of less knowledgeable groups to give advice on behaviour (promote password 
change when this was not the first step to a solution) suggests that establishing a voice of 
authority, representing the most knowledgeable experts, may be helpful to raise 
awareness and suggest action (see recent work on identifying authoritative actors by 
online communities by Bouguessa and Romdhane, 2015). And third, given the 
connections that marketing and entrepreneurs appear to foster (at least in this paper’s 
dataset), these may also be suitable target groups to disseminate information, in addition 
to the press. 
4.1 Theory reflections 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) recognises the role of attitudes, 
subjective norms and perceived control in predicting intentions, and subsequently, 
behaviour change. Attitudes played out in the communication of risk, with some tweets 
suggested very high levels of anxiety around the kinds of impact that Heartbleed may 
have. Perceived control and self-efficacy may also have been critical factors. Future 
research with Twitter users may be able to better determine the link between affect in 
tweets published in response to a critical incident and users stated beliefs about their 
ability to deal with the critical incident. The relative lack of password change advice from 
IT professionals and the press may have only added to this problem as there was little 
available or consistent guidance that addressed the way that individuals should take 
control. 
It is important to acknowledge that tweets may also be shaped by the presence of 
influential others on Twitter. Research suggests that when ‘important others’ on social 
media networks recommend actions on privacy, people are more likely to follow their 
advice (Saeri et al., 2014). Future research may wish to explore whether or not the 
presence of ‘favourite’ contacts (important others in the contact list) can influence the 
formation of attitudes and norms on new security issues. Such important others can be 
identified using eigenvector centrality measures, which measure the importance of a node 
(user) based on the number of important nodes (users) that link to that node (user). Users 
with higher centrality measures would then be expected to exert greater influence on the 
attitudes, norms and perceived control of those who follow that user. In addition, this 
research on social influence may also consider the influence of specific groups on 
followers when the group’s perceived expertise appears to be particularly important (e.g., 
IT expertise in the case of cybersecurity incidents). 
4.2 Contributions to research 
This research on influence makes three contributions to the literature. First, the paper 
provides an example of a recent case study in which the responsibility for informing the 
public was less clear, compared to regular (health) pandemics. In health pandemics, the 
drivers of information are news sources and health authorities (Love et al., 2013). At 
present it is not clear who drives information in the context of a security threat. 
Heartbleed represented a unique situation: uncertainty about the best course of action was 
high (particularly at the beginning), as was the ability of the individual Twitter user to 
affect change or improve the situation on their own. This uncertainty is common of 
security alerts where it is often unclear which course of action should be advocated. 
Second, the present findings also add to the work on message propagation and social 
influence (Anger and Kittl, 2011; Ye and Wu, 2010). For example, Ye and Wu (2010) 
examined message propagation following the death of a celebrity, focusing on stabilities, 
assessments, and correlations of social influence in their data. They proposed that social 
influence is wielded via followers (more followers suggest more influence on others), 
reply influence (greater replies received by a user suggests greater influence) and RT 
influence (with greater retweeting suggesting greater influence). Similar indicators were 
utilised in the present dataset. 
Third, this work adds to the literature on Twitter influence in cybersecurity, another 
domain similar to health that usually requires a rapid response to an emergency state. 
This paper outlined important communication patterns around Heartbleed, specifically 
how and to what extent different occupational groups would tweet and contribute to the 
same degree week in and week out to the debate about Heartbleed. Exploring this is 
important as information shared on Twitter is not equally influential. Some users are very 
influential and are widely followed and shared whereas others simply comment on the 
ideas of others (Tinati et al., 2012). This analysis enables us to identify potentially useful 
disseminator groups and provides an insight into the dynamics of how different groups 
communicate with each other. 
Finally, this paper makes a contribution to the work on risk communication (see work 
by Burns and Slovic, 2012). One area of interest in this area of risk and uncertainty 
management focuses on how to improve communication strategies to reach as many 
potentially affected individuals as possible. Identifying different groups’ responses to 
crises can reveal normative behaviours within each group and targeting these groups 
separately can lead to more persuasive appeals for behaviour change (Mols et al., 2014). 
The current results suggest that in the absence of a voice of authority, it is important to 
recognise which other groups may lead, shape and influence the debate. In addition, by 
observing and evaluating content of messages on a topic over time, it may be possible to 
study longitudinally how different groups respond to threat revelations, how perceptions 
change, and the extent to which risk-reducing strategies can be implemented with the 
help of the most trusted but also best connected communicators (Burns and Slovic, 2012). 
4.3 Limitations of exploratory study 
As is the case in many exploratory studies, a number of limitations are worth noting. First 
of all, we used very simple features to explore how Twitter users make sense of a security 
event. We employed a restrictive filtering approach, based on a single keyword. This may 
not be suitable for a ‘representative’ study of information sharing on Heartbleed as many 
tweets may also have discussed this incident without referring specifically to the precise 
keyword ‘Heartbleed’. However, this would be a criticism that can be employed to many 
Twitter searches that rely on specific keywords. 
Secondly, it is possible that the sample of tweets was biased towards one group due to 
the sampling method that was used. One alternative approach to using a top-down 
method (selecting classification codes) would have been to extract key words from data, 
and compare the results of the auto-classification subsequently with a small sample of 
manually coded groups to get the accuracy rate. However, in this case we believe that the 
classification rate of 48.1% using a limited number of keywords was promising. 
The decision to focus on specific occupational groups (IT, press, legal, financial, 
entrepreneurial, and marketing) was based on an a priori decision to consider all those 
with the highest stake in learning about Heartbleed as they may be more directly 
impacted. Of course, this list may not have been sufficiently exhaustive (e.g., we did not 
include very specific keywords such as ‘developer’ or ‘software engineer’ in the hope 
that the more general labels would suffice). However, it is also worthwhile to keep in 
mind that every Twitter user could comment on Heartbleed. Our interest was in certain 
key interest groups, not to identify every single group. Using specific user information 
(profile, tags, or comment based) to identify user groups sharing a common denominator 
(often a common interest, topics, emotions, or health conditions) is a shared element in 
news recommendations (see also Jonnalagedda and Gauch, 2013; Li et al., 2010) and 
e-health initiatives involving personalised health profiling (see Batool and Khan, 2012). 
Another approach to analysing data is to look at individual influencers. However, this 
requires data that captures the activities of the same number of tweeters over time (this 
was not an option in the current dataset). Future research may wish to explore this 
approach in combination with professional grouping. 
In addition, behavioural change could only be inferred from the content of tweets. 
Twitter users may use tweets to communicate, receive and exchange information – but 
not necessarily report on personal behaviour to the same degree that these users might on 
other, alternative social platforms. Furthermore, it was not possible to test whether 
password change intentions were driven by Twitter (or were derived from an external 
source) due to the ostensible expiry of the shortened URLs collected. 
The question of whether Twitter is predominantly a social network or a news medium 
has already been raised by others (e.g., Anger and Kittl, 2011; Kwak et al., 2010). This 
suggests that the utility of using Twitter data to examine behavioural change is an issue 
that certainly warrants further attention. It has also been suggested that Twitter may 
simply be a self-affirmation device. That is, Twitter may be a place where users can post 
their thoughts and reported behaviours to gain the approval of their peers. This may 
certainly be the case for more active Twitter users (see also Wang et al., 2012). In which 
case, it would be an effective mechanism for establishing normative attitudes. This also 
suggests that there are communities of influence on Twitter who share attitudes in 
accordance with what they perceive to be group norms. Such a perception would 
presumably be gained from other posts on Twitter. 
4.4 Future research 
There are a number of other avenues that deserve more attention in the future. To date 
there is little research that looks at public responses to cybersecurity threats on a large 
scale, which is one of the reasons for the relatively small number of studies that are cited 
in this paper. Several areas for future research could be considered. First, it may be useful 
to examine the degree to which Twitter influences behavioural change in situations where 
individual Twitter users can exert some kind of control over their security or health (a 
limitation in Heartbleed). 
Second, the utility of analysing threat discussions over time with the help of Twitter 
and other data sources should be explored further and extended to consider the role of 
emotion; in addition to the cognitive and behavioural content in messages (see also 
Slovic et al., 2004; Larsen et al., 2015). It was not possible to examine the persuasiveness 
of certain sentiments and to explore reactions to emotional content in this study. The 
discussion of perceived or actual expressed feelings may be helpful in understanding why 
some users are more or less likely to act on advice (an example here would be Kwak 
et al., 2010). This may be particularly important in the area of cybersecurity where the 
user often does not have the means to influence the situation, and acting on advice may 
require significant effort on behalf of the novice users. 
A less technical Twitter debate may present a better opportunity to explore the role of 
affect. Several methods for content and sentiment analyses already exist (e.g., ‘topic 
modelling’, see Blei (2012); ‘opinion mining’ and ‘sentiment analysis’, Pang and Lee, 
2008; see applications of other tools in Aragón et al., 2011; Ediger et al., 2010). Several 
such methods have already been implemented in libraries for languages such as Python 
and R. The examination of emotional content (see also Batool and Khan, 2012) in 
addition to a groups’ potential to support information dissemination and behavioural 
change may increase the effectiveness of risk communication strategies. Messages could 
be potentially tailored to different groups of respondents and stakeholders (Pang et al., 
2014; see also the literature review by Veil et al. (2011); this work discusses the use of 
social media in risk and crisis communication). Developing such guidelines to support 
risk-reducing strategies is one of our future research goals. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The findings from our case study analysis of Heartbleed may provide starting points for 
how to identify Twitter groups that may need to be targeted in future communication 
campaigns aimed at dispersing information about security. Further work in this area may 
help to pinpoint differences in the discourse of topics related to cybersecurity or health. 
This may subsequently present a useful means to develop more tailored or personalised 
interventions to shape risk communication and strategies in the health and cybersecurity 
domain. 
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